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Abstract
Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we
explore the question whether direct election of the mayor affects the size of local govern-
ments. Using difference-in-differences estimation and propensity score matching, we find
evidence that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower expenditure on public
administration and public personnel, however compensated by higher expenditure in the
visible categories of spending i.e. transportation, social protection and promotion of the
economy.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between fiscal federalism and the size of the public sector remains
an area in which no clear empirical picture prevails. Recent analyses of fiscal federalism
highlight that office–oriented politicians might abuse their power over the local budgets
according to own objective functions e.g. involve in rent extraction or corruption. Most
theories of competitive federalism support existence of smaller public sectors in decentral-
ized countries, on the basis of the argument that local decision makers are more accountable
to local voters and therefore have few opportunities to misbehave. Moreover, if the taxes
are raised at the local level, the local population will keep a close watch on the efficiency
of provision of public services financed from their own pockets. Therefore, political ac-
countability at the local level should provide a strong incentive to the politicians to reduce
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inefficient spending as well as involvement in rent seeking.
On the other hand, growing literature on local political budget cycles suggests, that
local politicians involve in budget manipulations before elections to increase the prospects
of reelection. It has been reported that total expenditure tends to rise before the elections
(see e.g. Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Castro and Martins, 2014; Furdas et al., 2015; Galli and
Rossi, 2002). The increase in spending is afterwards compensated either by an increase
in tax rates or deficit balancing through drops of expenditure shortly after the election
has taken place. Also, Brender (2003) has observed that reelection prospects substantially
affect the fiscal outcomes on the local level.
Wide literature addresses the question whether fiscal performance at the local level
affects the reelection probabilities. Following the seminal articles of Nordhaus (1975) and
Rogoff et al. (1990), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral manipu-
lation of fiscal instruments increases the incumbent’s chances of getting reelected, while
Veiga and Veiga (2007) use data from Portuguese municipalities to find that higher ex-
penditures over the whole term (and specifically in election years) increase the chances of
political success. This literature suggests, that incumbents have incentive to expand the
budgets of the municipalities in order to affect their reelection probabilities.
In this work, we want to explore the question, whether electoral rules, which affect the
incentives of politicians matter for the size of local government spending using a unique set
of electoral rules present in the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg. Arguably, the three
parallel voting systems in place in Vorarlberg represent a unique source of variation in
electoral incentives of the incumbents and levels of electoral accountability. The only other
country in Europe for which such institutional differences in the local election procedures
exist is Switzerland.
Previous literature exploiting the differences in local electoral systems focused mostly
on Swiss cantonal and municipal elections as well as German electoral law reforms. Pom-
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merehne (1978) exploits the fact that in the 1970s some Swiss municipalities were direct
democracies whereas others used a representative democratic system and finds that the
median voter model better reflects the pattern of expenditures if decisions are made di-
rectly. Similarly, Feld and Kirchgassner (1999) find that direct democracy has an impact
on debt levels of municipalities. More recent literature analyzes some fiscal aspects of
electoral rules for the German municipalities, that have undergone a change in the elec-
toral regime. Ko¨thenbu¨rger et al. (2013) finds that municipalities with appointed mayors
react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives. The change in municipal tax rates is
three times smaller compared with a system of direct mayoral elections. Similarly, Hes-
sami (2014) using the case of Hesse reveal that municipalities with a directly elected mayor
attract 5% more investment transfers from the state. This effect only materializes in the
election year which suggests that mayors under the new electoral rule put more effort into
grant applications for highly visible infrastructure projects in order to increase their re-
election probability. Blume et al. (2008) find that a switch to direct elections of mayors has
led to lower expenditures and revenues in the German state Schleswig-Holstein compared
to Baden-Wuerttemberg where direct elections were used all along. However, the analy-
sis suffers from the fact that expenditures are aggregated at the state-level. Egger et al.
(2007) focus on the introduction of direct mayor elections in Lower Saxony. The authors
find that local spending increases with direct mayor elections, in particular redistributive
spending. Unfortunately, this setting does not allow the authors to distinguish whether the
effect on spending levels can be attributed to electoral incentives or to the increased power
of the mayor which give the mayor more room for decision making. Finally, Ade (2014)
analyzes a switch of mayor appointment by the local council to direct mayor elections in
three German states and provides evidence that tax rates are lower and public spending is
higher with directly elected mayors.
As put forward by Drazen and Eslava (2010), voters and incumbents may prefer different
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types of government expenditures. Therefore, incumbents may try to influence voters by
changing the composition of government spending, rather than the total level of public
spending. In this perspective, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) found no evidence of a
political budget cycle for Canadian provinces with respect to aggregate spending. However,
they found a budgetary cycle for capital expenditures.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, we analyze whether
the electoral incentives matter for different types of local expenditure. Arguably, expendi-
ture categories visible to the voters should be affected in a different way than the categories,
which are not directly observed, and therefore less relevant for reelection prospects. In this
work, we are able to analyze the effects of the direct election of the mayor on different
categories of municipal expenditure. Secondly, unlike Egger et al. (2007), we are able to
identify the effect of the direct election independent of any changes to the competences of
the mayor, since the last changes to the competences of the mayor has taken place in the
years 1988 to 1994 during the adaptation of the Austrian law to the European Union stan-
dards, thus before the electoral law reform. Finally, since we concetrate on one region only,
we are able to eliminate most of the unobservable characteristics that could differentiate
the municipalities in a cross–country or a cross–regional sample.
In the next section, we present the institutions present in Vorarlberg and formulate
hypotheses about the impact of these institutions on the levels of public expenditure.
Section 3 presents the dataset, variables used in the regression as well as the methodology
of analysis. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 concludes the work.
2. Institutions and hypotheses
2.1. Institutional background
The state (German: ”Bundesland”) of Vorarlberg is the westernmost federation state
of Austria. It is further divided into 96 municipalities (Gemeinden) of diverse size and
4
area. Mostly populated is Dornbirn with 47.420 inhabitants whereas the least populated
Du¨nserberg inhabits only 144 members of the community. Municipalities in Austria and in
particular in Vorarlberg are divided into three administrative categories typically associated
with size: normal municipalities, market municipalities and cities. There are currently 80
normal municipalities, 11 market municipalities and 5 cities in Vorarlberg.
Typically, in most European democracies electoral rules at the local level are centrally
governed. In federal states, electoral rules may differ at the state level as well e.g. this
is the case in Germany and Austria. In Austria the latter is true for most federal states:
state law governs electoral laws for municipal elections. A unique exception to this rule is
observed in the federal state of Vorarlberg. The electoral rules are set at the local level
and since the year 2000 there exist three parallel systems in place: semi–open list for
the municipal council together with a direct election of the mayor, semi–open list system
often connected with preselection of the list members by the electorate and finally an open
election in which each eligible voter freely decides on whom to elect as a the member of the
municipal council. Before the year 2000, all municipalities have used a semi–open party
system without the direct election of the mayor.
In the semi open–list system, the local parties populate the party lists as well as suggest
candidates for the office of the mayor. Eligible electors can place one vote for a list to the
municipal council and one vote for a mayor’s office candidate. Additionally, each voter may
place up to five votes for individual candidates on the chosen list. If in a direct election of
the mayor only one candidate stands for the election, voters can still place a Yes/No poll.
In 2015, 60 out of 96 municipalities conducted the election according to this system.
The second variant is a different version of a semi open–list party system. It is often
preceded by a consultation with the electorate. Parties either send empty polls to the
voter who then place the names of desired candidates on the lists, or send a preselected
candidates’ lists and voters may decide on the order of placement. The mayor is, however,
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not directly elected but chosen by the council of the municipality among their freshly
elected members. In 2015, the system was used in 20 municipalities.
The last system is entirely open. Each voter receives an empty voting sheet at which
she is eligible to place names of desired members of the municipal council freely chosen
from all members of the community with a passive suffrage. She can choose a number
of names up to a double of the arranged seats in the local council. The newly elected
members of the council subsequently choose the mayor among themselves. In 2015, this
rule was used in 16 municipalities.
The role of the mayor in local decision making is very strong, both in legal and in prac-
tical terms. According to the municipal consitution provisions, mayors chair the municipal
council and the municipal board. They are chiefs of the communal administration and
implement the decisions of the local bodies. They have power over the municipal budget
and represent the community to the outside.
2.2. Hypotheses
We believe that the set of presented rules offers a unique opportunity to explore the
research questions. Unlike for the case of cross–country studies and country–level studies,
there are comparatively few factors that would affect the fiscal outcomes and differen-
tiate the local entities. Municipalities in the analyzed region differ on grounds of some
demographic variables, for which we control, but do not differ in terms of budgeting rules
or access to central government transfers, as these are either centrally or regionally (for
the whole Bundesland) predetermined. Some differences in the access to financing stem
from the fiscal equalization scheme, which aims at reducing the discrepancies between
the municipal ’financial strength’ (Finanzkraft), i.e. providing the means necessary for
the municipalities to perform a basic provision of public services and these differences are
controlled for as explained in Section 3. The above–cited literature offers a set of sugges-
tions as for how electoral rules should affect the fiscal outcomes. Firstly, different electoral
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rules systematically and independently of individual characteristics of the mayor affect
the probabilities of reelection. The probability of reelection in turn affects the incentives
faced by the politicians in making expenditure decisions. An important factor for deter-
mining the incentives of the local governments to manipulate the expenditure levels is the
rule-dependent prospect of reelection. The general idea behind electoral incentives is that
elections may motivate politicians to act in the interest of voters via the threat of not being
re-elected. In reality, this may lead for example to higher spending prior to an election
which may only be in the interest of voters in the short run. A reasonable hypothesis is
that when the mayor is elected directly, incentives to exert effort in a way that is visible
to voters are larger than in the opposite case system because the incumbent needs the
support of the electorate at large rather than only the (typically guaranteed) support of
her party to be re-elected.
On the other hand, direct elections of the mayor might, in certain cases increase the
possibility of reelection. In case the mayor is chosen indirectly from the members of the
council, she needs to stand against all the other members, number of which will typically
be much higher then the number of candidates standing for a direct election. If this is
true, directly elected mayor faces a stronger incentive to influence the expenditure levels.
Yet, a directly elected mayor does not necessarily have a support of the local council in his
executive decisions, as opposed to the indirect system, in which, by definition, the mayor
faces support of the municipal council. In such a case, expenditure might not be easily
manipulable by a directly elected mayor, and the effect will be unclear. This would be the
case, if the directly mayor and the municipal council represent different parties.
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Figure 1: Trends in the dependent variables
3. Methodology and data
3.1. Data
Data comprises information about 96 municipalities in Vorarlberg between years 1982
and 2013, a total of 2634 observations. Fiscal and demographic data has been obtained
from the Austrian Statistical Office database, whereas electoral data has been collected
from the electoral database of Land Vorarlberg (Vorarlberg, 2015).
Figure 1 shows the mean expenditure levels in the two groups of municipalities: these
that have switched to the direct election of the mayor in 2000 and these which have not.
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals the need for an empirical approach which would take
into account the initial differences between the municipalities which have switched to the
8
direct election of the mayor in 2000 and these which have not. In most categories of
expenditure we observe systematic differences between the two groups. As explained in
the next subsection we shall adress this issue by combining propensity score matching with
difference-in-differences approach.
Dependent variables in the regressions are the expenditure levels per capita for the total
expenditure as well as subcateogries of expenditure:
1. Public Administration
2. Security and Public Order
3. Education and Sport
4. Culture and Religion
5. Social Support and Housing
6. Health Protection
7. Transportation
8. Promotion of the Economy
9. Services
10. Finance (i.e. Debt payments)
11. Public Personnel
Main economic determinants of expenditure levels include, obviously the overall level
of revenue (Revenue – per capita), as well as access to sources of taxation. We include two
variables describing the financing patterns: Local Taxes and Profit Shares. Local taxes
include taxes on local economic activities such as tourist taxes, administrative fees, trade
taxes and property taxes as well as communal taxation and reflect the economic develop-
ment of the region. Profit shares are the shares of the municipality in the general taxation
stemming from the fiscal equalization scheme. Fiscal equalization schemes are negotiated
within the parliament every 4 years and determines the shares of the municipalities in
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the common taxation; these shares depend mostly on the population sizes but also on the
”Financial Strength” measured on the basis of tax base in property and the 3% munici-
pal wage taxation (”Kommunalsteuer”). The overall revenue of a municipality comprises
additionally grants and transfers, which are mostly earmarked.
Political variables have also been found to affect the levels of local expenditure. We
control for the electoral budget cycle. Municipal elections in the region take place every
five years, and in our sample the relevant years are 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and
2010. We also control for party effects with dummies OV P for the Christian–democratic
party, SPO for the social–democratic party and FPO for the populist Freedom Party of
Austria, as opposed to independent local commitees (base level). The dummy for OVP also
measures the vertiacal political alignment (in all analyzed periods the OVP party has won
the regional elections), which have been found (e.g. Bracco et al., 2013). We also control
for the fragmentation of the council (compare e.g. Houlberg and Pedersen, 2015): Variable
HHI is the Herhfindal Index of the of the council seat share of the parties. Additionally, we
add a dummy SingleParty for the cases when the Herhfindal Index equals 1, therefore all
council members come from the same party list. We control for the turnout at the election
and the level of political competition measured by the number of electoral lists standing
for the election, both before and after the electoral reform. Additionally we control for the
incumbency advantage, that is dummy Incumbent equals 1 if the current mayor has been
reelected. Dummy Divided equals 1 when the mayor in the direct election comes from a
different party than the majority in the municipal council.
Public expenditure at the local level is typically also determined by demographic and
geographic variables. These variables typically include the size of the population (Werck
et al., 2008; Costa-Font and Moscone, 2009) population density (Sanz et al., 2002), frac-
tion of the elderly and young inhabitants (Hayo and Neumeier, 2012; Veiga and Veiga,
2007), unemployment rates (Foucault et al., 2008) and some country specific controls. We
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control for all of these, however our measure of unemployement captures all members of
the community in the age between 15–64 who are not active in the employment market
(excluding students and pupils), and not only the individuals registered as unemployed or
actively seeking a job. Therefore, these numbers are in fact slightly higher than the official
unemployment rates. Since we dispose of information on the actual number of retired per-
sons, we use unlike other studies of local expenditure determinants, this variable instead
of population over 65 in the regressions. In fact, in Austria high share of population, for
various reasons, becomes retired before the usual legal age, and the actual number of re-
tired inhabitants is, in this case, a much better measure of demand for social services than
the age structure.
3.2. Empirical methodology
The unique feauture of the municipal elections in Vorarlberg, is that the choice of the
electoral rule is chosen by each municipality and for each election separately. Therefore,
there is variation in the electoral rule between as well as within the municipalities. This
variation is jointly determined by observable characteristics of the municipalities as well
as, potentially unobservables. We combine propensity score matching with difference-in-
differences to address the issue of potential endogeneity of the rules. This methodology
can be summarized as follows:
1. In the first stage we calculate propensity scores for the municipalities on the basics
of exogenous characteristics between 1982 and 1990, using a probit model.
2. The propensity scores are used for a year–by–year kernel propensity score matching
using Stata routine by Villa (2014).
3. The weights derived from the kernel estimation are then used in the final difference–
in–differences regression with additional covariates.
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The choice of the exogenous characteristics that enter the matching model is restricted
to the initial observed period, i.e. the first eight years. By this we want to avoid any changes
in the characteristics of the muncipalities in the last two electoral periods before the reform
which might happen in expectation of the changes (”anticipation effect”). Inclusion of the
initial outcome variable in the propensity score model should reflect the a priori preferences
for different types of expenditure intristic to the municipality members.
The final model, results of which are presented, is therefore:
outcomeit · weightsit =β0 + β1 · reformt + β2 ·Directit + β3 · reformt ·Directit+ (1)
Γ · Xit + ui + vt + it,
where β3 is the difference–in–differences estimator, Xit is the vector of controls and ui and
vt are the municipality and time fixed effects.
In the first stage probit calculation of the propensity scores, we match the municipalities
on the basics of initial characteristics, that is values for years 1982 to 1990: the levels of
revenue per capita, local taxation per capita, profit shares per capita as well as initial
values of the outcome variables. Results of the probit estimations are presented in Table
1.
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Municipalities that receive higher shares of the tax revenue from the fiscal equalization
scheme are more likely to change to the direct election system afterwards. As for individual
categories of spending, higher probability of treatment occurs for municipalities with ini-
tially higher levels of expenditure on healthcare and lower levels of expenditure on public
administration, security and promotion of the economy. The probabilities of treatment are
now used in the second stage to match the municipalities using kernel density matching, on
a year–by–year basis and for each expenditure category separately. The choice of the ker-
nel matching algorithm is dictated by practical purposes: the are relatively few untreated
observations in the sample, and a use of a matching algorithm without replacement would
mean a substantial loss of available data.
Propensity scores supports are depicted in Figure 2 in the Appendix. Results of the
balancing of the outcome variables are presented in Figures 3 to 14 in the Appendix.
We can observe that the matching is reliable, and the common support is very broad.
Therefore, the estimated propensity scores can be reliably used in the next stag1
4. Results
Table 2 presents the main results of the estimations. Notice first that the propensity
score matching procedure has significantly reduced the initial bias: in the main results,
there are no statistically significant differences in the outcome variables dependent on be-
longing to the treatment group (dummy Treatment). Lack of significance of the Treatment
dummy suggests that the matching procedure was effective.
According to the results preseted in Table 2, unlike in Ade (2014) the change to the
direct election of the mayor does not have an effect on the total level of expenditure. Yet, we
do observe a change in the composition of spending. After the reform, municipalities which
1For space–saving purposes we do not report the tests results of balancing covariates; these can be
obtained from the author upon request.
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elect the mayor directly spend on average 35 Euro less on public administration, compared
to these which have not change the electoral system. Similarly, we observe a drop in the
expenditure on services (91 Euro of the average 635 in this group of municipalties) and on
personal costs (32 Euro). On the other hand, municipalities with directly elected mayor
spend more on transportation and promotion of the economy.
Concentration of power in the municipal council is generally associated with higher
total expenditure levels as well as expenditure on services and personnel. We observe
strong party effects in expenditure on health, social support and personal costs: left–wing
mayors spending more in these categories and less on culture and economic promotion.
Moreover, in the municipalities in which the mayor and the council come from one of the
main national parties: OVP and SPO the debt levels are higher. In most categories of
expenditure whenever the directly mayor belongs to a different party than the majority in
the council, expenditure tends to be lower.
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4.1. Robustness analysis
Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix presents the results of the estimations, while correct-
ing for the potential outliers thus taking into account the assymetric distribution of the
outcome variables, thus including the observations below the 99th percentile and 90th per-
centile of the outcome variable respectively. Additionally Table 6 in the Appendix presents
results of the estimation without the municipalities with the City or Market status. These
corrections do not change the main conclusions: a significant decrease in the spending
on public expenditure and personnel costs is observed. A known problem whenever using
propensity score matching is a potential for too low standard errors, as estimation steps add
variation beyond the normal sampling variation. A One way to deal with this problem is to
use bootstrapping as suggested e.g. by Lechner (2002) is the use of bootstrapped standard
errors. Table 7 in the appendix presents the results of the estimation with bootstrapped
standard errors.
5. Conclusions
It is often hypothesised that a direct election of a president or a mayor can lead to
lower size of the public sector. In this work, we show that the local expenditure levels are
not necessarily lower if the mayor is elected directly. Indeed, we find that the expenditure
on public adminstration, public personnel and public services seems to be lower, yet other
categories of expenditure compensate the change. We link the latter finding to the op-
portunistic behavior of mayors, who wish to guarantee reelection by shifting expenditure
towards visible categories.
In our sample, the latter result relies on the fact that local governments are only to
low extent self–financing their activities. Unlike in the case of Swiss municipalities, which
rely mostly on own taxation, Austrian local governors face incentives to keep expenditure
levels high. The common pool problem in this case, does not allow for expression of fiscal
17
responsibility and the expected effect of direct election is mitigated.
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Appendix
Table 3: Summary statistics of the outcome variables
No Change Change to Direct
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. (t-test)
Total Expenditure 2688.111 2365.352 2106.484 1621.859 -6.441
Administration 291.119 210.122 213.56 135.966 -9.735
Security 95.52 190.921 52.528 77.523 -6.131
Education 298.928 239.441 313.101 273.327 1.385
Culture 52.136 70.192 60.212 82.667 2.620
Social 146.925 128.269 175.2 127.759 5.260
Health 106.241 101.186 142.163 189.849 6.644
Transport 175.793 229.784 176.551 222.966 0.006
Economy 217.752 419.033 120.377 330.404 -6.001
Services 994.706 1321.105 635.425 724.01 -7.309
Finance 308.815 511.054 224.92 387.57 -4.215
Personnel 306.102 289.319 335.64 237.402 2.425
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Figure 2: Propensity scores
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Figure 3: Matching on the outcome variable: Total Expenditure
Figure 4: Matching on the outcome variable: Administration
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Figure 5: Matching on the outcome variable: Security
Figure 6: Matching on the outcome variable: Education
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Figure 7: Matching on the outcome variable: Culture
Figure 8: Matching on the outcome variable: Social
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Figure 9: Matching on the outcome variable: Health
Figure 10: Matching on the outcome variable: Transport
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Figure 11: Matching on the outcome variable: Economy
Figure 12: Matching on the outcome variable: Services
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Figure 13: Matching on the outcome variable: Finance
Figure 14: Matching on the outcome variable: Personnel
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